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Temporal Explorations in Cosmic Consciousness  






UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 
 
	  	  Contemporary	   cinema	   has	   become	   brain-­‐cinema,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   very	   often	   the	  camera	  has	  moved	  almost	  literally	  into	  the	  characters’	  heads.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  a	  film	  like	  The	  Eternal	  Sunshine	  of	  the	  Spotless	  Mind	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  screwball	  comedy	  in	  the	  mind	  where	  ex-­‐lovers	  try	  to	  erase	  their	  memories	  of	  each	  other	  by	  performing	  a	   lobotomy	  of	  sorts,	  or	  there	  is	  Inception,	  where	  a	  team	  of	  dream	  invaders	  implant	  seeds	  of	  thought	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  others,	  and	  Divergent,	  where	  the	  main	  characters	  help	   each	   other	   by	   entering	   each	   other’s	   brain	   worlds.	   Many	   examples	   could	   be	  given.	  Typically,	  characters	  are	  hooked	  up	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  brain	  machine	  but	  such	  literal	   reference	   to	   neurological	   devices	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   demonstrate	   that	  contemporary	  screen	  culture	  has	  changed	  on	  an	  aesthetic	  and	  an	  ontological	   level.	  Following	   from	   Gilles	   Deleuze’s	   distinction	   between	   classical	   film	   as	   movement-­‐images	   and	  modern	   postwar	   film	   as	   time-­‐images,	   I	   propose	   calling	   contemporary	  cinema	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  ‘neuro-­‐images’.1	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Arguing	  that	  cinema	  has	  become	  a	  brain	  cinema	  naturally	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  body.	  Where	  does	  the	  body	  go?	  Doesn’t	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  neuro-­‐image	  confirm	  the	  traditional	  dualism	  between	  body	  and	  mind?	  Does	  it	  mean	  I	  accept	  the	  current	  deterministic	   ‘We	   are	   our	   brain’	   discourse—one	   of	   the	   current	   paradigms	   in	  neuroscience—which	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  reductionism,	  excluding	  not	  only	  the	  body	  but	  also	  the	  world?	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  if	  	  the	  neuro-­‐image	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  new	  materialist	  way,	  where	  body,	  brain	  and	  world	  are	   entangled	   in	   what	   Karen	   Barad	   proposes	   as	   a	   non-­‐representationalist,	  diffractional	   approach	   to	   matter	   and	   meaning.	   Barad	   does	   not	   speak	   specifically	  about	  cinema	  or	  the	  cinematographic,	  but	  here	  I	  argue	  that	  her	  ideas	  can	  be	  related	  productively	  to	  a	  post-­‐Deleuzian	  conception	  of	  contemporary	  image	  culture	  and	  its	  specific	  temporal	  and	  cosmic	  dimensions	  of	  consciousness.	  
—BEYOND REPRESENTATION OF TIME Both	   Barad	   and	   Deleuze	   have	   argued	   against	   representationalism	   and	   have	  proposed	   a	   more	   complex	   understanding	   of	   the	   connections	   between	   the	   world,	  science	  and	  philosophy.	  In	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  Deleuze	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  dominant	   ‘image	   of	   thought’	   is	   governed	   by	   representation,	   which	   means	  understanding	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  identity,	  analogy,	  resemblance	  and	  opposition.	  Deleuze’s	  objection	  to	  representational	  thought	  is	  that	  by	  understanding	  difference	  only	   in	   such	   a	   reductionist	   	   ‘principium	   comparationis’	   (real	   as	   opposed	   to	  imaginary;	  actual	  as	  opposed	  to	  virtual;	  man	  as	  opposed	  to	  woman,	  and	  so	  on)	  we	  cannot	   see	   the	  differences	   that	  matter.	  Deleuze’s	  proposal	   is	   to	   think	  difference	   in	  itself,	  and	   in	  combination	  with	  a	  complex	  understanding	  of	  repetition	  for	   itself.2	   In	  
Meeting	   the	   Universe	   Halfway,	   Barad	   also	   sets	   out	   to	   provide	   an	   alternative	   to	  representation.	  Barad	   explains	   representationalism	  as	   the	  belief	   in	   the	   ontological	  distinction	   between	   representations	   and	   that	   which	   they	   claim	   to	   represent.	   She	  argues	   in	   particular	   against	   the	   idea	   that	   that	  which	   is	   represented	   ‘is	   held	   to	   be	  independent	   of	   all	   practices	   of	   representing’.3	   Also	   in	   Barad’s	   view,	  representationalism	   has	   a	   problematic	   ‘principium	   comprationis’	   at	   work,	   since	  representation	   involves	   a	   reflection,	   a	   mirror-­‐image	   that	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   the	  ‘real	  thing’.	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Both	   Deleuze	   and	   Barad	   propose	   a	   worldview	   in	   which	   all	   elements	   (things,	  images	   and	   instruments	   of	   measurement)	   intra-­‐act	   and	   act	   on	   the	   world	   more	  directly	   and	   as	   such	   act	   in	   the	  world	  more	   directly.	   For	  Deleuze,	   cinematographic	  images	  have	  performative	  power;	  they	  do	  not	  just	  represent	  the	  world	  at	  a	  distance,	  but	   also	  operate	  with	  and	   in	   the	  world	   (like	  books,	   they	   ‘form	  a	   rhizome	  with	   the	  world’).4	  And	  Barad	  shows	  how	  a	  performative	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  practices	  ‘takes	  account	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  knowing	  does	  not	   come	   from	  standing	  at	  a	  distance	  and	   representing	   but	   rather	   from	   a	   direct	   material	   engagement	   with	   the	   world’.5	  Both,	  then,	  propose	  a	  new	  materialist	  approach	  to	  phenomena	  in	  the	  world	  beyond	  the	  dualism	  of	  representationalism.	  In	   the	   1980s,	   when	   he	   wrote	   The	   Movement-­‐Image	   and	   The	   Time-­‐Image,	  Deleuze	  argued	   that	   in	  assessing	  cinema	   it	  would	  be	  useful	   to	  see	  how	  the	  screen,	  the	  cinematographic	  image,	  is	  related	  to	  the	  biology	  of	  the	  brain.	  ‘[T]he	  brain	  is	  the	  screen,’	   he	   said	   famously	   in	  Cahiers	   du	  Cinema.6	  Much	  has	   been	  written	   about	   the	  differences	  between	  the	  movement-­‐image	  and	  the	  time-­‐image;	  here	  I	  look	  instead	  at	  contemporary	  cinema	  and	  elements	  of	  a	  third	  mode	  of	  cinema.	  But	  before	  doing	  so,	  I	  will	   recall	   briefly	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Deleuze	   has	   characterised	   the	   non-­‐dualist	  relations	  between	  body,	  brain,	  world	  and	  screen	  in	  the	  great	  modes	  of	  cinema	  that	  he	   introduced.7	   As	   Deleuze	   has	   demonstrated,	   in	   the	   classical	   cinema	   of	   the	  movement-­‐image	  relations	  between	  body,	  brain,	  world	  and	  screen	  are	  organic.	  They	  function	   according	   to	   the	   habitual	   and	   automatic	   sensory-­‐motor	   schemes	   that	  we	  have	   incorporated.	   In	   the	  movement-­‐image	  this	  organic	  relation	  between	  man	  and	  the	  world	   finds	   expression	   in	  many	   forms,	   but	   there	   is	   a	   basic	   principle	   that	   can	  guide	   us.	   Looking	   at	   the	   temporal	   ontology	   of	   this	   type	   of	   organic,	   sensory-­‐motor	  cinema,	   the	   present	   is	   something	   we	   can	   rely	   on.	   In	   the	   movement-­‐image	   the	  present	  gives	  us	  (as	  spectators),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  characters,	  a	  foundation	  in	  time	  that	  allows	   our	   bodies	   to	   orientate	   in	   space	   and	   allows	   our	   thoughts	   to	   relate	   to	   the	  perceived	  present.	  When	  we	   are	   in	   the	  present,	   everything	  we	   see	  has	   an	   organic	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  of	  the	  characters.	  A	  memory	  in	  the	  movement-­‐image	  is	  always	  an	  organic	  flashback	  that	  is	  provoked	  by	  and	  related	  to	  the	  present—but	  also	  always	  clearly	   distinct	   from	   that	   present:	   the	   actual	   (present)	   and	   the	   virtual	   (past)	   are	  clearly	   distinguishable.	   In	   Daybreak	   for	   instance,	   every	   object	   (a	   teddy	   bear,	   a	  photo),	   every	   detail	   in	   the	   room	   in	   which	   Jean	   Gabin	   has	   locked	   himself,	   is	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impregnated	  with	  organic	  significance.8	  Each	  object	  opens	  up	  another	  recollection	  in	  flashback.	  We	  always	  return	  from	  the	  past	  with	  a	  little	  more	  knowledge	  with	  which	  to	  perceive	  the	  present	  situation	  and	  understand	  how	  and	  why	  the	  character	  ended	  up	   in	   that	   room,	   surrounded	  by	   the	  police.	   The	  movement-­‐image	   gives	   us	   organic	  relations	  of	  body,	  brain	  and	  world,	  expressed	  on	  the	  screen	  in	  a	  temporal	  ontology	  of	  the	  present	  as	  stable	  sensory-­‐motor	  foundation.	  	  As	  Deleuze	  has	  demonstrated,	  this	  organic	  sensory-­‐motor	  relation	  has	  changed	  with	   the	   time-­‐image.	  World	  War	   II	   broke	   the	   habitual	   and	   organic	   sensory-­‐motor	  link	   of	   man/woman	   and	   the	   world,	   and	   a	   different	   ontological	   relation	   to	   time	  became	   more	   dominant.	   Amid	   the	   ruins	   of	   the	   war,	   a	   new	   mode	   of	   brain–body–screen–world	  relations	  emerged.	  Characters	  no	   longer	  knew	  how	  to	  move	  and	  act;	  they	   became	   wonderers	   and	   wanderers,	   seers,	   imprisoned	   by	   the	   traumas	   of	   the	  past,	   as	   in	   Roberto	   Rosellini’s	   Germany	   Year	   Zero	   (1948).	   It	   is	   not	   that	   these	  characters	  represent	  the	  traumatic	  experience	  of	  the	  war	  (even	  if	  this	  can	  be	  argued	  for	  on	  one	  level	  of	  understanding).	  Rather,	  the	  cinematographic	  apparatus	  connects	  to	   the	   new	   world	   order	   (or,	   rather,	   disorder)	   in	   an	   entangled	   way:	   following,	  exploring,	  expressing	  and	  producing	  new	  relations	  to	  the	  world.	  What	  happened	  in	  the	  time-­‐image’s	  temporal	  ontology	  is	  that	  instead	  of	  having	  a	  firm	  foundation	  in	  the	  present,	   the	   past	   becomes	  more	   dominant.	   In	  Hiroshima	  Mon	  Amour,	   for	   instance,	  layers	   of	   both	   the	   collective	   past	   and	   the	   personal	   past	   start	   to	   ‘flash	   up’	   in	   the	  present;	  almost	  involuntary	  the	  past	  starts	  to	  speak	  for	  itself.	  These	  images	  are	  not	  chronologically	  connected	  to	  the	  present,	  but	  they	  are	  more	  repetitive	  and	  haunting,	  popping	  up	  as	  reminders	  of	  the	  impossible	  and	  the	  intolerable	  that	  has	  happened	   ,	  which	  has	  not	  yet	  found	  an	  organic	  place	  to	  rest	  or	  to	  be	  understood.	  Similarly,	  the	  characters,	   and	   we	   as	   spectators,	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   sure	   about	   the	   difference	  between	  the	  virtual	  (past)	  and	  the	  actual	  (present).	  The	  enigmatic	  characters	  in	  Last	  
Year	  in	  Marienbad	  (Alain	  Resnais,	  1961)	  make	  us	  wonder	  about	  many	  things.9	  	  What	  happened	  last	  year?	  Is	  Marienbad	  a	  memory	  or	  a	  dream?	  Are	  we	  ever	  in	  the	  present	  anyway?	   All	   the	   films	   Deleuze	   defines	   as	   time-­‐images	   exemplify	   how	   the	   link	  between	  body–brain–screen–world	  has	  changed	  fundamentally.	  It	  is	  now	  grounded	  in	  (co-­‐existing	  layers	  of)	  the	  past,	  which	  the	  cinematographic	  apparatus	  connects	  to	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  produces.	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Deleuze’s	  conceptualisation	  of	   images	  has	  a	  Bergsonian	   inspiration	  that	  needs	  to	   be	   considered,	   with	   its	   continuous	   but	   variegated	   relationship	   between	  matter	  and	  memory,	   between	   the	   outside	  world	   of	   perception	   and	   the	   inner	  workings	   of	  memories,	  between	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  virtual.	  There	  is	  a	  perpetual	  exchange	  of	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  actual,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  more	  profound	  changes	  can	  be	  noticed.	  In	  the	   time-­‐image	   the	   virtual	   (from	   the	   past)	   gains	   more	   independent	   power,	  obstructing	  habitual	  sensory-­‐motor	  action	  (in	  the	  present).	  Images,	  to	  be	  conceived	  as	   blocks	   of	   matter-­‐memory,	   undergo	   a	   ‘mutation’.10	   It	   is	   a	   mutation	   within	   the	  virtual	   and	   actual	   forces	   contained	   within	   the	   image.	   This	   new	   mode	   of	  cinematography	  does	  not	  simply	  provide	  a	  different	  point	  of	  view	  on	  the	  world	  as,	  for	   instance,	   Rancière	   proposes	   to	   see	   the	   difference	   between	   movement-­‐images	  and	   time-­‐images.	   Something	   more	   profound	   within	   the	   temporal	   ontology	   of	   the	  image	   itself	   has	   changed.11	   These	   changes	   are	   immanently	   related	   to	   the	   world.	  While	  World	  War	  II	  is	  a	  marker	  for	  these	  shifts,	  Deleuze	  never	  argues	  it	  was	  the	  only	  cause	  of	  the	  remarkable	  change	  in	  cinema.	  There	  were	  internal	  causes,	  such	  as	  the	  limits	   of	   the	   movement-­‐image	   in	   turning	   into	   clichés	   or	   into	   propaganda;	   and	  external	   influences	   such	   as	   the	   war	   and	   its	   direct	   consequences	   for	   European	  cinema	  production,	   including	   the	  development	  of	  new	  and	   lighter,	  more	  moveable	  cameras	   and	   other	   equipment,	   not	   to	  mention	   the	   deep	   traumatic	   effects	   the	  war	  had	  on	  the	  general	  population:	  	  the	   crisis	   which	   has	   shaken	   the	   action-­‐image	   [i.e.	   movement-­‐image]	   has	  depended	  on	  many	   factors	  which	  only	  had	   their	   full	   effect	   after	   the	  war,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  social,	  economic,	  political,	  moral	  and	  others	   internal	  to	   art,	   to	   literature,	   to	   cinema	   in	   particular.	   We	   might	   mention,	   in	   no	  particular	   order,	   the	   war	   and	   its	   consequences,	   the	   unsteadiness	   of	   the	  ‘American	  Dream’	   in	   all	   its	   aspects,	   the	  new	   consciousness	   of	  minorities,	  the	  rise	  and	  inflation	  of	  images	  both	  in	  the	  external	  world	  and	  in	  people’s	  minds,	   the	   influence	   on	   the	   cinema	   of	   the	   new	  modes	   of	   narrative	   with	  which	   literature	   had	   experimented,	   the	   crisis	   of	   Hollywood	   and	   its	   old	  genres…12	  	  The	   list	   of	   ‘causes’	   is	   inconclusive.	   It	   is	   clear	   we	   cannot	   speak	   of	   one	   linear	  causal	  relation	  between	  a	  ‘given’	  historical	  cause	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  expression.	  In	  fact,	  it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   Deleuze’s	   conception	   of	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   the	   movement-­‐
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image	   and	   time-­‐image	   are	   closer	   to	   what	   Karen	   Barad	   has	   called	   ‘phenomena’	   of	  entangled	  matter-­‐meaning	   that	  call	   for	  a	  new	  conceptualisation	  of	  causality.	  Barad	  redefines	   materiality	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   Niels	   Bohr’s	   quantum	   philosophy–physics,	  conceiving	  any	  phenomenon	  as	  entangled	  matter	  and	  meaning,	  composed	  of	   intra-­‐acting	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  practices.13	  As	  Barad	  describes	  in	  Meeting	  the	  Universe	  
Halfway,	   this	   new	   form	   of	   causality	   needs	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   various	   related	   agential	  apparatuses	   at	   work	   within	   the	   phenomenon.14	   The	   relations	   between	   different	  agencies	  are	   important	  because	  they	  constitute	   the	  phenomenon.	   In	   fact,	   ‘relations	  precede	  or	  determine	  the	  relata’.15	  The	  entangled	  nature	  of	  different	  agential	  forces,	  or	   apparatuses,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   everything	   is	   conflated	   in	   a	   pool	   of	  undifferentiated	  mass,	  but	  that	  within	  phenomena	  differences	  come	  to	  matter.16	  It	   is	   impossible	   here	   to	   do	   justice	   to	   Barad’s	   sophisticated	   and	   extended	  explication	  of	   this	  new	  non-­‐dualist	  conception	  of	  materialism,	  and	   I	  will	  only	  raise	  one	  other	  central	  concept	  in	  her	  conception	  of	  matter.	  This	  is	  ‘diffraction’,	  the	  trope	  Barad	   uses	   as	   an	   alternative	   for	   ‘reflection’,	   which	   is	   usually	   employed	   to	  understand	   the	   relation	   between	   things	   (such	   as	   world	   reflected	   in	   images)	   in	  representationalism.	   Barad	   uses	   the	   concept	   to	   describe	   her	   methodological	  approach	   to	   attending	   to	   ‘specificities	   of	   relations	   of	   difference	   and	   how	   they	  matter’.	  As	  she	  explains,	  where	  the	  metaphor	  and	  physical	  phenomenon	  of	  reflection	  implies	   mirroring	   and	   sameness	   (comparable	   to	   the	   dominant	   ‘image	   of	   thought’	  that	   Deleuze	   describes	   in	   Difference	   and	   Repetition),	   ‘diffraction	   is	   marked	   by	  patterns	  of	  difference’.17	  Reflection	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  representations	  have	  no	  effect	   on	   the	   object	   of	   representation,	   because	   the	  world	   is	   held	   at	   a	   distance.	   In	  diffraction,	  the	  world	  is	  entangled	  with	  material-­‐discursive	  practices	  that	  engage	  in	  its	   becoming	   through	   intra-­‐actions.18	  Transposing	  Barad’s	  methodology	   to	   cinema,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   Deleuze’s	   conception	   of	   images	   is	   fundamentally	   intra-­‐agential	   in	  this	  new	  materialist	   sense:	   screens	  and	   the	   images	  on	  our	  screens	  are	  not	  distinct	  from	   the	   world	   (as	   second	   order	   representations	   at	   distance)	   but	   they	   form	   an	  integral	  part	  with	  it.	  Cinematographic	  images	  are	  part	  of	  the	  fabric	  of	  the	  world	  that	  is	  woven	   between	   screens,	   bodies	   and	   brains	   and	   nonhuman	  phenomena.	   Cinema	  has	   performative	   power	   in	   that	   cinematographic	   images	   are	   intra-­‐agents	   that	  contribute	   to	   the	   emergence	  of	  new	  phenomena	   (thoughts,	  memories,	   actions),	   all	  juggling	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  virtual.19	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In	  this	  sense,	   it	  can	  also	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  movement-­‐image	  and	  the	  time-­‐image	   continue	   to	   become,	  mutate	   and	   change	   together	  with	   other	   phenomena	   in	  the	   world.	   When	   I	   am	   arguing	   that	   in	   the	   neuro-­‐image	   we	   have	   yet	   a	   different	  relation	  between	  brains,	   bodies,	   screens	  and	  worlds,	   then,	   I	   do	  not	  mean	   to	   imply	  that	  the	  old	  relations	  have	  disappeared	  or	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  total	  break.	  Rather,	  the	   image	   has	   evolved,	   as	   has	   our	   ontological	   relationship	   to	   the	   world	   and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world.	  New	  apparatuses	  (in	  science,	  in	  technology,	  in	  politics)	  and	  new	   entanglements	   also	   change	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   co-­‐evolution.	   In	   The	   Neuro-­‐
Image	  I	  propose	  several	  ‘causes’,	  in	  this	  new	  agential	  sense,	  that	  have	  led	  to	  a	  slow	  emergence	   of	   a	   third	   age	   of	   cinema.	   The	   fall	   of	   the	   Berlin	  Wall	   on	   11	   September	  1989	  and	   the	   fall	  of	  New	  York’s	  Twin	  Towers	  on	  11	  September	  2001	  are	  marking	  events	  around	  which	  several	  changes	  emerged.	  Connected	  to	  these	  marking	  events	  there	  are	  heterogeneous	  other	  phenomena	  such	  as	  a	  changed	  world	  order	  (the	  end	  of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   War	   on	   Terror),	   the	   rise	   of	   hyper	  capitalism,	   the	  digital	   revolution	   (from	   the	  massive	   introduction	  of	   the	  PC	   to	  Web	  2.0)	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  neurosciences	  (with	  new	  non-­‐invasive	  visualisation	  technology	  such	   as	  MRI	   scans).	   All	   these	   events	   have	   precursors,	   and	   none	   of	   these	   events	   is	  uni-­‐directly	   related	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   aesthetics	   and	   ontology	   of	   the	   image.20	   The	  simple	   observation	   that	   I	  want	   to	  make	   here,	   though,	   is	   that	   in	   a	   new	  materialist	  conception	   of	   the	   image,	   all	   these	   agents	   cooperate	  within	   and	  with	   the	   image-­‐in-­‐becoming.	  	  Before	   delving	   more	   deeply	   into	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   embodied	   and	   embedded	  nature	  of	  the	  brain	  in	  the	  neuro-­‐image,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  close	  connection	  to	  some	  strands	   in	  contemporary	  neuroscience,	   I	  offer	  a	   few	  words	  about	  how	  the	  temporal	   ontology	   of	   the	   neuro-­‐image	   is	   entangled	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   digital	  technology.	  It	  is	  both	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  neuro-­‐image—the	  digital	  as	  related	  to	  its	  specific	  temporal	  relations	  and	  neuroscience	  as	  related	  to	  the	  body—that	  I	  develop	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  essay.	  
—THE MAKING OF TEMPORALITY: DATABASE LOGIC AND OPEN FUTURES If	  one	  compares	  the	  temporal	  ontology	  of	  contemporary	  cinema	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  to	  previous	   image	   types,	   it	   is	   striking	   that	   the	   future	   has	   become	   such	   an	   important	  temporal	   reference.	   It	   is	   not	   that	   there	   was	   no	   concept	   of	   the	   future	   in	   previous	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image	   regimes;	   one	   can	   think	   of	   the	   future	   from	   both	   the	   present	   (as	   a	   habitual	  anticipation)	   or	   from	   the	   past	   (as	   a	   cyclic	   repetition	   based	   on	   knowledge	   of	   the	  past).	   Rather,	   we	   can	   observe	   that	   the	   future	   has	   gained	   a	   different	   status	   as	   the	  dominant	  temporal	  framework	  of	  our	  age.	  Compared	  to	  the	  certainty	  of	  the	  present	  as	  safe	  anchor	  in	  the	  movement-­‐image,	  and	  to	  the	  haunting	  return	  of	  the	  past	  in	  the	  time-­‐image,	   in	   the	   neuro-­‐image	   the	   future	   as	   such	   (always	   to	   some	   degrees	  undetermined)	  has	  become	  the	  most	  important	  time-­‐scale	  from	  which	  to	  think	  and	  rethink	   the	   present	   and	   the	   past.	   In	   the	   larger	   argument	   about	   the	   temporal	  dimensions	  of	  the	  neuro-­‐image	  I	  explain	  these	  differences	  in	  temporal	  ontologies	  in	  the	   movement-­‐image,	   time-­‐image	   and	   neuro-­‐image	   by	   referring	   to	   the	   three	  synthesis	  of	  time	  developed	  by	  Deleuze	  in	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.21	  	  In	  this	  way	  it	  becomes	  possible	   to	   see	  how	   the	  present,	   the	  past	  and	   the	   future	  are	  proposed	  as	  three	   different	   ways	   of	   synthesising	   time:	   past,	   present	   and	   future	   can	   be	  synthesised	  from	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  present	  (first	  synthesis),	  from	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	   co-­‐existent	   layers	   of	   the	   past	   (second	   synthesis),	   or	   from	   open-­‐ended	   future	  (third	   synthesis).	   In	   terms	   of	   cinema,	   the	   neuro-­‐image	   has	   the	   future	   (as	   third	  synthesis	  of	  time)	  as	  its	  ontology.	  And	  since	  the	  future	  has	  not	  happened	  yet,	  it	  has	  a	  speculative	   dimension	   to	   it:	   we	   can	   think	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   scenarios,	   parallel	   or	  serialised,	   of	   what	   might	   happen,	   what	   would	   happen	   or	   what	   will	   happen.22	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  virtual,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  virtual	  is	  now	  more	  defined	   as	   ‘what	   might	   happen’	   or	   ‘what	   might	   have	   happened’	   (as	   endless	  potentialities)	   than	   by	   ‘what	   has	   happened’	   (as	   the	   co-­‐existing	   layers	   of	   the	   pure	  past	  in	  the	  time-­‐image).	  	  It	   is	   not	   so	   difficult	   to	   see	   that	   we	   have	   entered	   a	   period	   in	   which	   we,	  collectively,	   predominantly	   think	   from	   a	   future-­‐perspective.	   One	   simply	   needs	   to	  think	   of	   polling,	   profiling,	   pre-­‐emptive	   measurements	   and	   other	   predictions	   and	  pattern	  recognitions	  that	  determine	  increasingly	  our	  actions	  in	  politics,	  policing	  and	  prevention	   strategies.	   This	   obsession	  with	   the	   future	   enfolds	   in	   itself	   again	  many	  intra-­‐agential	   forces.	   But	   one	   particular	   ‘strong	   intra-­‐agential	   force’	   is	   digital	  technology—especially	   the	   way	   everything	   can	   be	   stored	   in	   databases	   that	  accumulate	   increasing	   amounts	   of	   documents,	   images,	   sounds,	   files	   and	   other	  information.	   These	   Big	   Data	   databases	   have	   several	   characteristics,	   including	  random	   access	   and	   algorithmic	   pattern	   search,	   comparison	   and	   reconfigurations,	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and	   reordering.	   A	   concrete,	   albeit	   obvious,	   example	   from	   contemporary	   cinema	  makes	  this	  clear.	  In	  the	  film	  Minority	  Report	  (2002),	  it	  is	  Tom	  Cruise’s	  character’s	  job	  to	  prevent	  crimes	  before	  they	  have	  happened,	  based	  on	  predictions	  by	  clairvoyants.	  The	   narrative	   of	   this	   film	   shows	   what	   it	   means	   to	   think	   and	   act	   based	   on	  indeterminate	   speculations	   from	   the	   future.	   But	   the	   logic	   behind	   the	   power	   of	  prediction	  that	  informs	  the	  actions	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  every	  past,	  present	  and	  predicted	  crime	  can	  be	  stored	  digitally	  in	  databases.	  Significantly,	  too,	  Minority	  
Report	   introduces	   the	   touch	   screen	   five	   years	   before	   it	   became	   a	   common	   object	  with	  the	  iPhone—indeed,	  at	  designer	  conferences	  this	  film	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  virtual	  inspiration	   for	   the	   iPhone’s	   screen.	   The	   touch	   screen	   and	   the	   tactile	   and	   affective	  qualities	  of	  the	  image	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  digital	  logic	  of	  the	  neuro-­‐image,	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return.	  What	  I	  most	  want	  to	  point	  out	  here	  is	  that	  the	  digital	  implies	  a	  database	  logic	  that	  allows	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  reconfigurations,	  remixings	  and	  re-­‐orderings	  of	  past	  and	  present	  events.	  	  Remixing	  and	  re-­‐ordering	  are	  things	  one	  does	  from	  future	  points	  of	  view,	  in	  the	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time.	  As	  Deleuze	  points	  out,	  the	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time	  is	  the	  most	  complex,	  since	  it	  cuts,	  assembles	  and	  (re)orders	  from	  the	  virtual	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  future	   to	   create	   something	  new.	  As	   James	  Williams	  explains,	   in	  Deleuze’s	  work	  on	  the	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  openness	  of	  the	  future	  with	  respect	  to	  expectancy	  and	  archiving,	  ‘freeing	  ourselves	  from	  the	  particular	  ways	  time	  has	  been	  synthesized	  in	  the	  present’23	  For	  Deleuze,	  this	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time	  is	  profoundly	  related	   to	   Nietzsche’s	   concept	   of	   the	   eternal	   return	   of	   difference	   and	   the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  return	  of	  the	  same.	  This	  philosophical	  framework	  is	  important	  in	  understanding	   Deleuze’s	   complex	   temporal	   ontological	   philosophy,	   but	   for	   my	  concerns	  here,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  also	  useful	  to	  make	  a	  connection	  to	  Karen	  Barad’s	  agential	  philosophy	  of	  diffraction.	  Using	  this,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  our	  contemporary	  digital	  tools	  intra-­‐act	   with	   our	   conception	   of	   time—besides	   the	   database	   they	   also	   imply,	   for	  instance,	   serialised	   and	   parallel	   narratives	   in	   convergence	   culture	   and	   digital	  aesthetics.	  One	  can	  think	  very	  concretely	  of	  the	  remixing	  and	  mash	  ups	  of	  images	  on	  YouTube	  which	  create	  an	  open-­‐ended	  series	  of	  versions	  of	  the	  past,	  as	  one	  can	  see,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  various	  remixes	  of	  The	  Battle	  of	  Algiers.24	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  radical	  contingency	  that	   John	  Akomfrah	   in	   films	  such	  as	   the	  poetic	  The	  Nine	  Muses	  (2010)	   embraces	   through	   remixing	   and	   reordering	   of	   the	   often-­‐unseen	   materials	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found	   in	   the	   depths	   and	   folds	   of	   the	   British	   migration	   film	   archives.	   Akomfrah	  indicates	  why	   revisiting	   and	  unfolding	   the	   archive	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   creation	  of	  new	  perspectives	   (‘free	   from	  the	  particular	  ways	   time	  has	  been	  synthesised	   in	   the	  present’):	  It	  is	  important	  to	  read	  images	  in	  the	  archive	  for	  their	  ambiguity	  and	  open-­‐endedness.	  Migrants	  were	  often	  filmed	  in	  relation	  to	  debates	  about	  crime	  or	  social	  problems,	  so	  that’s	  how	  they	  get	  fixed	  in	  official	  memory.	  But	  that	  Caribbean	  woman	  standing	  in	  a	  1960s	  factory	  isn’t	  thinking	  about	  how	  she	  is	  a	  migrant	  or	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  British	  state;	  she’s	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  thinking	  about	  what	  she’s	  going	  to	  eat	  that	  evening	  or	  about	  her	  lover.25	  	  Akomfrah	  adds	  that	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  of	  working	  with	  the	  archive	  is	  that	  one	  has	  to	   work	   with	   what	   there	   is.	   History	   in	   itself	   is	   not	   changed.	   But	   we	   can	   create	  different	   relations	   to	   it,	   because	   there	   is	   a	   radical	   contingency	   in	   the	   actualised	  forms	   of	   history	   and	   indeterminacy	  within	   the	   layers	   of	   time.	   This	   allows	   it	   to	   be	  bended	  and	  reshaped	  in	  concrete	  forms	  that	  can	  escape	  from	  mnemonic	  depths	  and	  get	   a	   new	   life,	   thus	   creating	   a	   new	   possibility	   for	   the	   future.	   For	   Deleuze	   this	   is	  important	   for	   keeping	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   future	   that	   differs	   from	   the	   past,	  important	  for	  his	  idea	  of	  politics	  and	  a	  ‘people	  to	  come’.26	  Barad,	  referring	  to	  Derrida	  rather	   than	  Deleuze,	   also	   emphasises	   ‘the	   possibilities	   for	   justice-­‐to-­‐come	   [which]	  resides	   in	   every	   morsel	   of	   finitude’.27	   This	   is	   the	   politics	   of	   material	   diffractional	  practices	   in	   which	   matter	   and	   meaning	   are	   intensely	   entangled	   ontologically,	  epistemologically	  and	  ethico-­‐politically.	  Barad,	  too,	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  that	  we	  can	  undo	  the	  past	  but	  that	  ‘the	  past	  is	  open	  to	  change.	  It	  can	  be	  redeemed,	  productively	  reconfigured	   in	   an	   iterative	   unfolding	   of	   spacetimematter’.28	   Arguing	   from	   a	  quantum	  mechanics	  perspective,	  Barad	  calls	   this	   the	  making	  of	   temporality,	  which	  seems	  to	  resonate	  in	  important	  ways	  with	  Deleuze’s	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time:	  [Time]	   is	   not	   universally	   given,	   but	   rather	   time	   is	   articulated	   and	   re-­‐synchronized	  through	  various	  material	  practices	  …	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  the	  past	  and	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  are	  entangled	  with	  one	   another	  …	   they	   exist	   in	   intra-­‐active	   entanglements.	   That	   is	   the	   only	  reason	   we	   get	   a	   diffraction	   pattern,	   by	   the	   way.	   And	   importantly,	   the	  original	   diffraction	   pattern	   doesn’t	   return,	   a	   new	   one	   is	   created,	   one	   in	  which	  the	  diffraction	  (that	  is,	  entanglement	  effects)	  is	  a	  bit	  challenging	  to	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trace.	  So,	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  one	  of	  erasure	  and	  return.	  What	  is	  at	  issue	  is	  an	  entanglement,	   intra-­‐activity.	   The	   ‘past’	   was	   never	   simply	   there	   to	   begin	  with,	   and	   the	   ‘future’	   is	   not	   what	   will	   unfold,	   but	   ‘past’	   and	   ‘future’	   are	  iteratively	   reconfigured	   and	   enfolded	   through	   the	  world’s	   ongoing	   intra-­‐activity	   …	   the	   fantasy	   of	   erasure	   is	   not	   possible,	   but	   possibilities	   for	  reparation	  exist.29	  	  	  When	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  neuro-­‐image	  has	  its	  own	  particular	  temporal	  configuration	  of	  time,	  predominantly	  ‘made’	  from	  the	  future	  (or	  possible	  future	  scenarios),	  this	  is	  a	  temporal	   logic	   that	   is	   entangled	   with	   the	   concrete	   material	   practice	   of	  cinematography	   (as	   a	   practice	   of	   rewriting	   history)	   in	   the	   digital	   logic	   of	   our	  contemporary	  age.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  third	  synthesis	  of	  time	  has	  only	  come	  into	  being	  with	   the	   neuro-­‐image;	   the	   three	   syntheses	   of	   time	   form	   a	   temporal	   ontology	   of	  modern	   man	   more	   generally.30	   But	   I	   do	   want	   to	   argue	   that	   one	   ‘apparatus	   of	  measurement’	   that	   is	   an	   agential	   practice	   which	   has	   performative	   power	   and	  influences	  how	  we	  conceive	  our	   temporal	  relations	  are	  our	  digital	   tools,	  entangled	  as	  they	  are	  with	  our	  conception	  of	  time	  as	  predominantly	  conceived	  from	  the	  future.	  
—THE EMBODIED BRAIN IN CONTEMPORARY COSMIC CINEMA As	   indicated	   earlier,	   a	   salient	   characteristic	   of	   the	   neuro-­‐image	   as	   cinema	   of	   the	  digital	   age	   is	   that	  we	   increasingly	   experience	   the	  world	   from	  within	   a	   character’s	  brain	   space.	   This	   is	   related	   ‘intra-­‐agentially’	   to	   the	   enormous	   growth	   of	  neuroscience	  and	  the	  prominent	  place	  of	   the	  brain	   in	  the	  culture	  of	  our	  times.	  The	  dominance	   of	   the	   brain	   in	   contemporary	   culture	   has	   met	   considerable	   criticism,	  especially	  from	  a	  humanities	  and	  social	  science	  perspective	  where	  the	  reductionist	  idea	   that	   ‘we	   are	   our	   brain’	   has	   been	   problematised.31	   However,	   contemporary	  neuroscience	   has	   many	   branches,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   increasingly	   taking	   the	  embodied	   and	   embedded	   nature	   of	   the	   brain	   into	   account.	   Arguably,	   these	  approaches	   imply	   a	  more	  modest,	   or	   at	   least	   a	  more	   interconnected,	   place	   for	   the	  brain.32	   In	   the	   neuro-­‐image,	   too,	  we	   encounter	   an	   embodied	   and	   embedded	   brain	  that	   implicitly	   resonates	  with	   such	  developments	   in	  neuroscience.	   It	   is	  possible	   to	  see	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  expression	  of	  brain-­‐worlds	  in	  the	  time-­‐image	  where	  mental	  landscapes	  are	  often	  rendered	  with	  more	  distance,	  as	  in	  the	  mise-­‐en-­‐scene	  of	  
Last	  Year	  in	  Marienbad.	  There	  is	  certainly	  passion	  or	  violence	  in	  the	  brain-­‐cinema	  of	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Alain	   Resnais	   or	   Stanley	   Kubrick,	   as	   Deleuze	   discusses	   in	   The	   Time-­‐Image.33	   The	  mental	   spaces	   and	   brain	   worlds	   of	   the	   neuro-­‐image,	   however,	   are	   much	   more	  embodied,	   affective,	   visceral	   and	   sensuous.	   Considering	   this	   aesthetic	  transformation	   in	   a	   diffractional	   way,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   argue	   that	   new	   insights	   in	  neuroscience	  co-­‐evolved	  with	  these	  changes.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  new	  materialist	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  immediate	  connection	  between	  matter	  and	  meaning.	  Let	  me	  unfold	  this	  further	  through	  looking	  more	  specifically	  at	  the	  genre	  of	  science	  fiction,	  which	  has	  developed	  interesting	  ways	  to	  connect	  outer	  and	  inner	  space.34	  	  Science	  fiction	  and	  voyages	  to	  other	  planets	  have	  been	  part	  of	  cinematographic	  imagination	   since	   George	   Méliès’	   A	   Trip	   to	   the	   Moon	   (1902),	   made	   when	   actual	  space-­‐travel	   was	   considered	   pure	   fantasy.	   In	   the	   1950s,	   when	   aeronautic	   space	  exploration	   became	   an	   element	   in	   the	   Cold	  War,	   outer	   space	   and	   alien	   invasions	  appeared	  as	  metaphors	  for	  the	  dangers	  of	  communism	  and	  nuclear	  attacks	  in	  many	  cult	  films.	  The	  Day	  the	  Earth	  Stood	  Still	  (Robert	  Wise,	  1951)	  and	  War	  of	  the	  Worlds	  (Byron	   Haskin,	   1953)	   are	   the	   two	   most	   notable	   of	   the	   many	   cosmic	   Cold	   War	  allegories.	  While	   Stanley	  Kubrick	   gave	  his	   own	   satirical	   take	   on	   the	  Cold	  War	   and	  space	   technology	   in	   the	   black	   comedy,	  Dr	   Strangelove,	   or	  How	   I	   stopped	  Worrying	  
and	  Learned	   to	  Love	   the	  Bomb	  (1964),	  a	   couple	  of	  years	   later	  he	   took	   the	  genre	  of	  science	  fiction	  to	  an	  entirely	  new	  level.	  The	  beautiful	  composition	  of	  every	  image	  of	  
2001:	  A	  Space	  Odyssey	  (1968),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  meticulous	  craftsmanship	  of	  the	  special	  effects	  of	  spaceships	  and	  the	  solar	  system,	  elevated	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  genre	  as	  a	  whole.	   The	   realistic	   portrayal	   of	   state	   of	   the	   art	   space	   technology	   and	   knowledge	  about	  orbital	  conditions	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  added	  an	  important	  scientific	  dimension	  that	  took	  the	  film	  beyond	  mere	  fantasy.	  
Figure 1:  Screen shots from A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968) 
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Before	   men	   actually	   landed	   on	   the	   moon	   in	   1969,	   Kubrick’s	   space	   travellers	  coped	  with	  zero	  gravity	  and	   floating	  objects.	  Most	   importantly	   the	   film	   introduced	  metaphysical	  questions	  of	  humanity’s	  relation	  to	  technology	  and	  the	  vastness	  of	  the	  cosmos.	   Of	   course	   these	   questions	   were	   not	   new	   in	   the	   1960s,	   but	   the	   way	   they	  obtained	   a	   new	   cinematographic	   expression	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   more	  philosophical	  cosmic	  investigations	  of	  life	  in	  film	  history.	  Andrej	  Tarkovsky’s	  Solaris	  (1972),	   for	   instance,	   is	   another	   film	   that	   brought	   a	   metaphysical	   dimension	   into	  outer	   space	   narratives.	   In	   this	   film	   an	   astronaut	   travelling	   to	   the	   planet	   Solaris	   is	  confronted	   with	   the	   materialisation	   of	   his	   unconscious	   thoughts	   in	   his	   deceased	  wife,	   who	   keeps	   on	   appearing	   inside	   the	   space	   ship.	   Tarkovsky’s	   film	   questions	  human	   consciousness	   in	   a	   cosmic	   perspective.35	   Within	   commercial	   Hollywood	  cinema	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  George	  Lucas’s	  Star	  Wars	  trilogy	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	   1980s	   transported	   the	   classic	   genre	   of	   the	  western	   into	   space.	   Space	  which	  becomes	   the	   new	   frontier,	  with	   the	   traditional	  western	   battle	   between	   ‘good’	   and	  ‘bad’	   continuing	   extra-­‐orbitally.	   In	   spite	   of	   enormous	   differences	   in	   modes	   of	  narration,	   the	   cinematographic	   cosmic	   explorations	   of	   these	   films	   that	   reinvented	  the	  science	  fiction	  genre	  are	  all	  related	  to	  actual	  space-­‐travel.	  With	  varying	  degrees	  of	   metaphysical	   depth,	   they	   all	   show	   characters	   that	   explore	   galactic	   space	  extensively	   by	   leaving	   the	   planet	   Earth.	   As	   Deleuze	   indicated	   when	   discussing	  Kubrick’s	  space	  odyssey,	  the	  cosmology	  of	  galaxies	  can	  meet	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  brain	  in	  a	  philosophical	  and	  scientific	  search	  for	  life	  and	  death.36	  	  The	   cosmic	   continues	   to	   be	   an	   important	   reference-­‐point	   for	   metaphysical	  investigation,	   and	   has	   become	   an	   even	   more	   profound	   dimension	   of	   twenty-­‐first	  century	  cinema.	  An	   important	  difference,	  however,	   is	   that	  actual	  space-­‐travel	   is	  no	  longer	  an	  absolute	  condition	  for	  cosmic	  consciousness.	  The	  cosmos	  has	  become	  part	  of	  our	  consciousness	  without	  the	  need	  to	  show	  space	  travellers	  literally	  leaving	  the	  terrestrial	  orbit.	   In	  any	  event,	  even	  in	  Gravity,	  as	   I	  will	  argue,	   the	  relation	  between	  Earth	  and	   the	  other	  planets	   tends	   to	  be	  explored	   intensively	   (in	   time,	   in	   the	  mind)	  rather	  than	  extensively	  (in	  space).	  The	  neuro-­‐image	  is	  also	  profoundly	  occupied	  with	  an	   intensive	   cosmic	   consciousness	   different	   from	   the	   space	   explorations	   in	   the	  previous	   generation	   of	   films	  mentioned	   above.	   The	   Spanish	   film	  Earth	   is	   an	   early	  example	  	  of	  this	  	  new	  intense	  	  cosmic	  cinema.37	  The	  main	  character	  of	  the	  film,	  Angel,	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Figure 2: Screen shots from Earth (Julio Medem, 1996) is	   a	   woodlice	   fumigator	   on	   a	   Spanish	   island.	   Dressed	   in	   a	   white	   fumigator	   suit,	  standing	  in	  the	  red	  stony	  landscape	  of	  the	  island,	  he	  looks	  like	  an	  astronaut	  on	  Mars.	  Throughout	   the	   film,	   suggestions	   are	   made	   that	   he	   is	   an	   angel	   descended	   from	  heaven—or,	  that	  he	  suffers	  from	  schizophrenia	  and	  thinks	  he	  is	  an	  angel	  descended	  from	   heaven.	   The	   narrative	   keeps	   his	   actual	   status	   ambiguous.	   In	   any	   case,	   Angel	  seems	   to	   be	   a	   mental	   space	   traveller.	   He	   regularly	   refers	   to	   the	   mysterious	   and	  awesome	  complexity	  of	  both	  the	  brain	  and	  the	  cosmos.	  In	  Earth	  we	  never	  leave	  the	  planet	   and	   yet	   we	   travel	   into	   the	   cosmic	   dimensions	   of	   the	   universe	   through	   the	  mental	  journey	  of	  its	  main	  character.	  	  Lars	   von	   Trier’s	   Melancholia	   (2011)	   is	   another	   example.	   This	   film	   is	   the	  expression	  of	  pure	  affect,	  a	  pure	  intense,	  inner	  experience.	  It	  is	  an	  apocalyptic	  story	  where	  the	  Earth	  is	  hit	  by	  another	  planet,	  Melancholia.	  But	  more	  than	  that,	  the	  planet	  Melancholia	   is	   the	  expression	  of	  depression	  and	  fear,	  embodied	  by	   Justine	  and	  her	  sister,	  Claire.	  	  
Figure 3: Screen shots from Melancholia (Lars von Trier, 2011) 	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In	   Solaris	   the	  main	   character	   had	   to	   travel	   to	   another	   planet	   to	   confront	   his	  fears	  related	  to	  memories	  of	  his	  deceased	  wife,	  but	  in	  Melancholia	  we	  neither	  leave	  Earth	   nor	  make	   the	   distinction	   between	  what	   is	   real	   and	  what	   is	   imagined.	   Every	  image,	  every	  sound	  in	  the	  film	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  pure	  cosmic	  affect.	  Another	  film,	  
The	  Tree	  of	  Life,	  opens	  up	  a	  cosmic	  perspective	  and	  returns	  the	  question	  of	  Being	  to	  the	   genesis	   of	   life	   on	   Earth,	   referring	   to	   God’s	   powers	   of	   creation	   that	   manifests	  greatness	  in	  glimpses,	  a	  ray	  of	  light,	  the	  rustling	  of	  trees,	  a	  newborn	  baby.	  And	  James	  Cameron’s	   Avatar	   (2009)	   could	   be	   considered	   the	   Star	   Wars	   of	   the	   digital	   age.	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  differences	  from	  Star	  Wars,	  Avatar	  is	  closest	  to	  the	  action	  genre	   of	   science	   fiction	  with	   its	   battle	   between	   good	   and	   evil	   that	   involves	   space-­‐travel.	  But	  even	   in	  this	  action	  genre	  we	  experience	  the	  whole	  adventure	  (this	   time	  quite	  literally)	  on	  the	  brain	  screen	  of	  the	  main	  character,	  who	  needs	  to	  be	  hooked	  up	  to	  a	  cerebral	  machine	  to	  enter	  the	  planet	  Pandora.	  Each	  of	  these	  films	  demonstrates	  a	  changed	  relation	  to	  the	  cosmic	  that	  deserves	  analysis	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   But	   for	   this	   moment,	   most	   important	   is	   the	   cosmic	  consciousness	  that	  Kubrick	  brought	  into	  cinema	  by	  leaving	  Earth	  and	  travelling	  into	  space.	  Contemporary	  cinema	  translates	  this	  idea	  intensively,	  travelling	  into	  the	  mind	  and	  travelling	  differently	  in	  time,	  not	  from	  the	  past	  or	  present	  to	  the	  future,	  but	  from	  the	   future	  back	   to	   the	  present	   and	   the	  past.38	   Let	  me	   conclude	  by	  unfolding	   this	   a	  little	  further	  in	  respect	  to	  two	  other	  cosmic	  neuro-­‐images.	  
The	   Fountain	   (Aronofsky,	   2006)	   presents	   the	   mental	   landscape	   of	   its	   main	  character	  and	  asks	  metaphysical	  questions	  about	  life	  and	  death.	  What	  would	  it	  mean	  to	  live	  forever?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  die?	  These	  universal	  questions	  are	  enfolded	  in	  three	   variations,	   across	   three	   ages.	   Moving	   between	   sixteenth-­‐century	   Spain,	  twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  North	  America,	  and	  a	  twenty-­‐fifth	  century	  somewhere	  in	  outer	  space,	   The	   Fountain	   is	   essentially	   the	   story	   of	   the	   same	   couple,	   played	   by	   Hugh	  Jackman	  and	  Rachel	  Weisz.	   In	  the	  present,	   the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  Tom	  is	  a	  brain	  surgeon	  who	   tries	   to	   find	   a	   cure	   for	  his	  wife	   Izzy,	  who	  has	   a	  brain	   tumour.	   She	   is	  dying;	  she	  will	  die.	  He	  wants	  to	  find	  a	  cure	  for	  death.	  This	  story	  unfolds	  into	  the	  past	  where	  conquistador	  Thomas	  wants	  to	  save	  Spain	  and	  the	  Queen	  Isabelle	  by	  finding	  a	  holy	  tree,	  the	  tree	  of	  life,	  in	  the	  New	  Spain;	  and	  into	  the	  future	  where	  the	  astronaut	  Tom	  	  travels	  	  through	  	  space	  	  in	  a	  biospheric	  	  ‘bubble-­‐ship’,	  	  and	  tries	  to	  deal	  with	  the	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Figure 4a: Screen shots from The Fountain (Darren Aronofsky, 2006) previous	  stories.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  future	  that	  the	  film	  is	  told.	  At	  least	  this	  is	  where	  inner	  space	  is	  translated	  as	  outer	  space	  and	  takes	  us	  on	  a	  mental	  journey.	   	  As	  with	  other	  cosmic	   films	   of	   the	   neuro-­‐image,	   the	   brain	   world	   is	   visceral	   and	   sensual,	   full	   of	  affection-­‐images,	   faces	  and	  hands	   in	   close-­‐up,	   smelling,	   touching	  and	   tasting.	   If	  we	  are	   in	   a	   brain	   world	   here,	   if	   outer	   space	   is	   actually	   inner	   space,	   it	   is	   in	   a	   very	  embodied	  and	  embedded	  kind	  of	  aesthetics.	  There	  is	  noticeably	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  sensual	  aspects	  of	  the	  brain	  world	  than	  there	  is	  in	  the	  ‘colder’	  and	  more	  ‘distant’	  rational	  mise-­‐en-­‐scene	  of	  Kubrick’s	  mental	  worlds.	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In	  this,	  and	  in	  respect	  to	  its	  temporal	  ontology,	  The	  Fountain	  is	  a	  typical	  neuro-­‐image.	  First,	  because	  of	  its	  speculative	  dimension:	  when	  the	  narrative	  departs	  from	  the	  future,	  the	  story	  is	  serialised.	  As	  in	  other	  neuro-­‐images,	  such	  as	  Mr	  Nobody	  (Van	  Dormael,	  2009)	  and	  Cloud	  Atlas	  (Tykwer	  and	  Wachowski,	  2012),	  the	  story	  contains	  parallel	  lives	  told	  from	  a	  future	  parallel	  world.39	  The	  Fountain	  also	  shows	  us	  that	  it	  is	  









Figure 4b: Screen shot from The Fountain (Darren Aronofsky, 2006) 
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also	   the	   time	   of	   spiritual	   and	   ethical	   choices.	   The	   re-­‐doing	   of	   time	   is	   intrinsically	  related	  to	   ‘the	  material	  configurings	  of	  spacetimemattering’.40	  Again	  we	  notice	  that	  the	   neuro-­‐image	   is	   sensual	   and	   physical,	   profoundly	   connected	   to	   its	   embedded	  environment.	  It	  is	  a	  connection	  beyond	  the	  human	  action-­‐sensory	  motor	  scheme	  of	  the	  movement-­‐image	  and	  beyond	  the	  petrification	  of	  the	  past	  of	  the	  time-­‐image.	  The	  microcosmos	   of	   the	   brain	   and	   the	   macrocosmos	   of	   the	   celestial	   and	   planetarian	  outer	  space	  are	  fundamentally	  connected,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  everybody	  returns	  to	  stardust	   and	   the	   cycle	   of	   eternal	   return	   continues.	   The	   last	   neuro-­‐aesthetic	  characteristic	  of	  the	  future	  is	  that	  it	  relates	  to	  death	  and	  the	  acceptance	  of	  death	  as	  a	  spiritual–ethical	  choice	  of	  the	  inevitable.	  	  And	  then	  there	  is	  Gravity	  (Alfonso	  Cuarón,	  2013).	  Like	  Interstellar	  (Christopher	  Nolan,	  2014),	  Gravity	   is	  a	  contemporary	  science	  fiction	  that	  seems	  to	  bring	  us	  back	  to	  extensive	  space	  exploration.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   there	  are	  many	  reasons	   to	  argue	  these	  films	  are,	   like	  The	  Tree	  of	  Life	  and	  The	  Fountain,	  neuro-­‐images	  that	  deal	  with	  celestial	   consciousness	   as	   inner	   space	   travel	   in	   different	   ways	   from	   the	   cosmic	  cinema	   of	   the	   time-­‐image.	   I	   consider	   Interstellar	   a	   neuro-­‐image,	   because	   of	   its	  temporality	   and	   the	   very	   prominent	   idea	   of	   parallel	   worlds	   from	   the	   future.	  However,	  I	  focus	  in	  this	  last	  section	  on	  Gravity’s	  cosmic	  new	  materialism.	  Gravity	  is	  as	  much	  about	  mourning,	  death,	  love	  and	  life	  as	  the	  other	  cosmic	  neuro-­‐images	  that	  I	  have	  mentioned.	  While	   tethered	  on	  a	  space	  ship,	  dealing	  with	   the	   loss	  of	  gravity,	  trying	   to	   avoid	   orbital	   debris	   and	   finding	   her	   way	   back	   to	   earth	   in	   broken	  equipment,	  medical	  engineer	  Ryan	  Stone	  (Sandra	  Bullock)	  is	  coping	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  her	  daughter.	  Most	  of	  the	  film	  we	  are	  inside	  Stone’s	  capsule,	  even	  inside	  her	  head.	  At	  certain	  moments	  we	   know	   for	   sure	   that	   we	   are	   experiencing	   the	   delirium	   of	   this	  desperate	   main	   character.	   It	   is	   when	   she	   is	   hallucinating	   that	   her	   colleague,	  astronaut	  Matt	  Kowalski	  (George	  Clooney),	  who	  just	  died,	  returns	  to	  tell	  her	  not	  to	  give	   up.	   But	   the	  whole	   film	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   delirious	   ‘neuro-­‐image’,	   an	   inner	  struggle	   presented	   as	   an	   outer	   space	   adventure,	   as	   ‘two	   forces	   of	   death	   which	  embrace’.41	  Cuarón’s	  Gravity	  is	  as	  visually	  stunning	  as	  Kubrick’s	  2001:	  A	  Space	  Odyssey,	  	  but	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  science	  fiction.	  What	  we	  see	  is	  not	  a	  futuristic	  image	  that	  projects	  an	  image	   of	   the	   future	   from	   the	   past	   and	   the	   present	   into	   outer	   space;	   rather,	   it	   is	   a	  realistic	  	  image	  of	  	  ‘the	  future	  that	  is	  now’,	  	  a	  spacetime	  from	  which	  we	  can	  look	  back	  




















Figure 6: Screen shots from 2001, A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968) 
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  Figure 7: Screen shots from Gravity (Alfonso Cuarón, 2013) downwards,	  back	  to	  earth.	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  if	  the	  metaphysical	  star	  child	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Kubrick’s	  film	  has	  matured	  and	  returned	  to	  Earth	  as	  a	  fully	  grown	  woman	  who	  has	  suffered	   and	   struggled	   but	   who	   finally	   manages	   to	   overcome	   her	   grievances	   and	  loss.	   As	   some	   critics	   have	   argued,	   this	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   answer	   to	   the	  depressive	   collision	   of	   planets	   in	   Von	   Trier’s	  Melancholia.43	   Fallen	   back	   on	   Earth,	  Ryan	  Stone	  is	  reborn.	  Gravity	  is	  as	  much	  a	  metaphysical	  film	  as	  Tree	  of	  Life	  and	  The	  
Fountain.	  A	  metaphysics	  that	  asks	  us	  not	  to	  look	  up	  and	  away	  from	  Earth	  into	  space,	  but	   to	  return,	  discovering	  a	   ‘new	  materialism’,	   calling	   for	  a	  renewed	  connection	   to	  the	   elements	   of	   planet	   Earth	   in	   which	   our	   bodies,	   brains	   and	   screens	   are	   in	   a	  continuously	  evolving	  entanglement.	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  1985,	  1989,	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  an	  even	  earlier	  case	  in	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  Van	  Dormael,	  2009)	  and	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  Tykwer	  and	  Andy	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  40	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  in	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  and	  van	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  Tuin,	  New	  Materialisms,	  p.	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  41	  Deleuze,	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  Time-­‐Image,	  p.	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  Keyser,	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  Touching	  the	  Void’,	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  November	  2013,	  pp.	  80–5.	  43	  Roger	  Luckhurst,	  ‘Gravity:	  Space	  is	  the	  Place’,	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